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Perhaps it all goes back to the chapter in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nation where he
writes about ‘b’ professions: ‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker’, he argues, ‘that we expect our dinner, but from their regard
to their own interest.’He then elaborates: ‘We address ourselves, not to their human-
ity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their
advantages’ (Smith , book I, ch. II). Smith’s discussion of the role of self-interest
in ‘b’ professions omitted bankers. Yet bankers face conflicts of virtue that are not
really different from those experienced by bakers, brewers, or butchers. Just like
them, bankers rely on trust from customers, trust that they have to acquire, maintain
and protect. On this account, crises represent infelicitous instances: a natural casualty
of a financial crisis may be the word of the banker.
This article will explore how, as a result of this, crises ‘make’ economic discourse.
The conventional focus on crises as events where financial capital destroyed is com-
plemented. Crises become serious, I argue, because they destroy linguistic capital. To
see why, recall that the performative role of economic discourse in shaping economic
reality has often been emphasised. But few seem to realise that if this is so, then crises
have special significance as infelicitous events par excellence, with a capacity to
1 Many thanks to Cécile Bishop and an anonymous referee for detailed comments and encouragement
on an earlier draft.
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reverberate on discourse. Economic discourse is an asset that has value because of its
performative properties. Crises put this capacity to perform at stake. More than any-
thing else, financial crises are therefore crises of speech, a challenge to discourse. The
violent indictment of ‘conflicts of interest’ in public debates following the subprime
crisis provides an illustration for the present time. It is not that conflicts of interest
become more serious when a crisis happens, nor even that they are ‘revealed’.
Rather, crises open a breach in former linguistic strategies. As a result, crises create
a need for reconstructive discourse, in the same way accidents require reconstructive
surgery. I conclude that studying the politics of post-crisis discourse is of utmost
importance.
The current crisis is no exception to this trend. It challenges the previous belief,
perhaps best captured by Gordon Gekko’s diatribe in Oliver Stone’s Wall Street,
that greed would have cleansing properties: that ‘greed is good, greed is right,
greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the evol-
utionary spirit. Greed, in all of its forms; greed for life, for money, for love, knowl-
edge has marked the upward surge of mankind. And greed, you mark my words,
will not only save Teldar Paper, but that other malfunctioning corporation called
the USA.’ This discourse has been damaged by the subprime mess and would be
hard to proffer before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. We may be
observing the first stages of a recomposition of discourse on finance and the
market economy. At the same time, since all this is happening right now, it is dif-
ficult to identify clearly trends and patterns. A historical perspective may be useful.
The current crisis has often been compared to the crisis of . Economists and
policymakers have described the policies adopted as fighting the comeback of this
fearful crisis. But one relevant comparison with the interwar period has been
entirely left out: the way discourse on finance was revolutionised by the Great
Depression.
This is a huge topic for a short article. Yet, at the cost of some focus, it is possible to
derive a number of important sugggestions regarding how crises make discourse. In
this article, I approach this issue through a discussion of the historical evolution of
the discourse about bankers’ responsibility or conflicts of interests in originating
and distributing loans to foreign governments. This focus provides a valuable and col-
ourful entry point. The reason is that talk of foreign government debt is a linguistic
microcosm where many species of figures of speech are found. Moreover, crashes
have left tangible traces in the shape of parliamentary investigations, which are
always the climax of a crisis. In particular, two famous reports concerned with
trouble in the foreign bond market, situated in distant points in time, provide a
start. These are Britain’s Select Committee on Loans to Foreign States of  and
America’s Senate Committee on Finance on the Sale of Foreign Bonds of –, the fore-
runner hearings to the more popular and broader Pecora investigation on Stock
Exchange (mal)practices. These sources, and other secondary and archival material
as well, are put to work to suggest that the interwar crisis produced a separation of
speech and act where they used to be combined.
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IThe market for foreign government debt was started more than  years ago in
Amsterdam and, as a result, this is where traces of the reputation argument are first
found. Fourteen years after Smith published the Wealth of Nations Cazenove, a
broker, suggested that the reason why certain banks succeeded in this market and dis-
tributed larger amounts of loans than their competitors was that they had a reputation.
They were careful, and had to be, because investors made their picks on the basis of
the confidence which intermediaries inspired. The business of selling foreign govern-
ment securities to the public was a matter of prudent enterprise and success arose from
the ‘care, which those houses take to only introduce in the market solid loans and to
monitor the respect of all forms’, and in particular from avoidance of giving the
impression that ‘rash business’ was involved (see Riley , pp.  and –). In
other words, banks had to be like Dickens’s imagined Tellson banking house,
which famously kept young bankers ‘unseen like a cheese until they had the full
Tellson’s flavour and blue-mould upon them’ (A Tale of Two Cities, p. ). Self-
restraint, even being boring, was the key to success. The reason why bankers or
bakers would not cheat customers is not because they did not have a desire to do
so – they did. But they had an even bigger desire, which was to increase the
number of their customers and for this they had to be boring. Reputation was the phi-
losopher’s stone that transmuted the mud of greed into the riches and plenty of vera-
city. The argument has become common knowledge today, even as bankers look
more like Gordon Gekko.
Yet there is nothing natural about the reputation argument. Like any other social
object, it was constructed over time – in the instance, ‘reputation’was constructed as
an antidote to ‘conflict of interest’. The biography of the reputation argument is
enmeshed with successive reincarnations of the international bond market and sub-
sequent financial disasters. At a broad level, the cycle looks timeless and proceeds
according to a familiar sequence: crashes nurture regrets, regrets nurture blame.
Concerns arise about greed, greed captures the limelight. Bankers come under
public criticism for having originated and distributed poor securities. It is then
realised that bankers have made tons of money through underwriting and distri-
bution fees as well as their informed purchases and sales policy. Investors for their
part buy high, sell low, bear the loss. Yet this appearance of a pattern conceals
much historical variation.
A milestone is the Select Committee on Loans to Foreign States of . The
Select Committee was gathered in the middle of a sovereign debt debacle that had
about  per cent of outstanding securities defaulted, according to various calcu-
lations (Suter ). The ambiance of the boom is captured in Henry Drummond
Wolff’s semi-imaginary description of underwriting practices in the s and
s (). One London financier is informed that a loan is required by some
Latin American country. ‘The foreign Government, perhaps, has sent an agent to
England, or a friend of the Finance Minister is known to be lodging at Morley’s
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Hotel’ in Trafalgar Square. The financier ‘of course, knows everything concerning
the country’. ‘“I think it can be done at ,” he soliloquizes, and sends for two con-
fidential brokers. “Can’t be done,” says one. “It was offered Baring’s at , and they
refused.” “Yes, but they volunteered to take it firm at ,” rejoins the other…. “I
think it can be done at ,” again soliloquizes the financier, and putting on his hat
he makes for Morley’s Hotel.’ Then there is a dinner attended by ‘retired Indian
and Colonial officials be-ribboned’, a few admirals, a member of a late government.
These, Drummond Wolff suggests, are ‘all anxious to become Directors of
Companies, all counting upon selling the new loan at a premium’. Attending that
dinner are also leading investors, stockbrokers, journalists, and a lobbyist described
as a ‘politician who has perhaps made a hobby in Parliament of the country in ques-
tion’. An activist minority bondholder (appropriately enough, he turns out to be a
clergyman) is also involved. At the end of the dinner ‘the diplomatic representative
makes speeches in a language utterly unknown to his fellow-guests. The financier…
confides in English equally unintelligible to the Finance Minister’s relative that the
loan, if successful, will be entirely owing to his – the financier’s – abilities; that if
unsuccessful, failure will only be attributable to the rotten and bankrupt state of
the borrowing country.’2
In the actual story, the loan was to Honduras or Costa Rica or Paraguay, which
focused much of the Select Committee on Loans to Foreign States’ attention.
Critically, the crisis raised doubts about the quality (or value) of bankers’ speech.
It was said that ‘by means of exaggerated statements in the prospectus the public
have been induced to believe that the material wealth of the contracting State
formed a sufficient security for the repayments of the money borrowed’.3
Companion to this debased talk was the suspicion of excess profits explaining why
the Committee did focus on fees. Fees had been kept secret from the public. For
Honduras, post-crisis disclosures put them somewhere around  per cent of the
amount raised by the borrowing state. Even this could only be an approximation
because fees were hidden in complex formulas and inflated purchase prices for indus-
trial goods, which the loans were intended to finance. Fees for Costa Rica stood
around  or  per cent. The icing on the cake came when Honduras defaulted
and bondholders converged on the offices of the contractor of the loan, the house
of Bischoffsheim-Goldschmidt, a continental shop with a London office. They
found the doors closed and the banker gone. The Select Committee did summon
Mr Bischoffsheim: a health certificate would be produced instead by Freshfield, the
City lawyer,4 but the banker was hiding in Paris.
2 Drummond Wolff () contains an entertaining account of what Jenks (, p. ) describes as a
‘typical loan negotiation of the [eighteen] seventies’.
3 Report from the Select Committee on Loans to Foreign States,  (hereinafter Report ), pp.
xliv–xlix.
4 Report , p. .
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I I
Members of the Select Committee also found evidence of bankers’ wrongdoing in
market manipulations in what was known as ‘price rigging’. Bankers had originated
securities without regard to the actual position of the country. They had created a fic-
titious market, having one broker selling above issue price, and another one buying at
that price just to make sure The Times would report the security trading at premium,
thereby getting investors excited and stirring a market.5 The argument was eventually
picked up in the Select Committee’s final report:
In order to induce the public to lend money upon a totally insufficient security, means have
been resorted to which, in their nature and object, were flagrantly deceptive. The price at
which the dealings took place in no way represented the value of the stock. It was fixed by
the contractor or his agents at a premium, in order to induce the public to believe that the
loan was a good investment, or that they would … realize a premium. The public had no
means of learning that the contractor was the principal in these transactions… Thus there
was no apparent difference between a genuine and a fictitious market.6
The important element here is that it was the failure of the market that constituted the
wrongdoing.
But wrongdoing had varied across intermediaries, and as a result speech also varied.
This is perceptible from the strategies used by the bankers questioned. Baron Erlanger
of the eponymous house, who was accused of such dealings when introducing the
securities of Costa Rica, claimed this was normal business: the French government,
he said, did it for all its public offerings to ensure success.7 This was true, but then
the Baron was also positive that Costa Rica would pay. ‘They can and they will if
they only see that they must’, the Baron (who had also distributed some bizarre
Cotton Bonds for the Confederacy during the US Civil War) insisted.8 Others
tried the escape route. A long-time representative of the house of Barings (with
the full Baring flavour and blue-mould upon him?) said they would never do such
things, but historians have reasons to believe otherwise.9 As for Nathaniel Meyer
de Rothschild, he explained that the distribution of securities during the early place-
ment of a loan had to be made in a careful way, by ‘dividing those [investors] that we
consider bona fide from those that we consider speculative’. This way you would get
rid of the fictitious transactions that surrounded issues and were indeed not a desirable
thing. But beyond that, he thought underwriters did what they had to do. He recalled
an instance when his grandfather stepped in to make a market for a Neapolitan loan
5 In his testimony, Herman de Zoete suggests thatThe Times grew so concerned about the practice that it
refused to report prices until the full allocation of securities to the public began (Report , pp.
–).
6 Report , p. xlv.
7 Select Committee, pp. -, Q.  ff.
8 Select Committee, p. .
9 The evidence in Flandreau and Flores (, forthcoming) suggests that prestigious brands such as
Barings made efforts to ensure the success of their issues.
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that had been ‘badly placed’. So much for the ‘natural’ operation of the market and
the need to avoid tampering: the wall between sound practice and market rigging,
between good deeds and evil doing, between reputation and conflict of interest,
once it was brought into the daylight, was a slim and translucent one.10 Samuel
Herman de Zoete, chairman of the Committee of the London Stock Exchange,
recognised this when he was asked about market manipulations and answered: ‘It is
very difficult to form an opinion upon that.’11
The point was that speech and credit were banker dependent. The old rhyme ‘in
speculation your language you must choose: it’s an investment if you win, but a
gamble if you lose’ was compounded by the question of who had been in charge.
Statistical work shows that speculation in foreign government bonds was an investment
withRothschilds, but a gamblewith Erlangers.12 The rhymemay be lost, but an insight is
gained: the Select Committee displayed the competition of speech thatwas the backbone
of the British financial system and manifested the greater performativity of Rothschilds’
word. The dramaturgy of the hearings also suggested that the outcomewas preordained.
Rothschild was one of the last to be questioned and his testimony played the role of a
catharsis (his recommendations were followed). Critically, Rothschild laid the blame –
for greediness – on those investors who had put their moneywith governments, yielding
fabulous returns, through contractors, daring to sell such bonds. The imprudent buyers
were the ones who deserved punishment – and they had already been punished. The
mass was said, and the crisis was recycled to illustrate the greater competitive value of
the word of some bankers: those really in charge.
I I I
About  years later, the Senate Committee on Finance Hearings on the Sale of
Foreign Bonds was convened inWashington to deal with a looming global bond dis-
aster that would eventually leave deep scars in the international financial system.
Similar concerns and a similar wording were observed, except of course that British
English and American English are different languages. Again, default rates would
be somewhere around  per cent. In the fall of , as the international bond
market evaporated, New York bankers were grilled by a group of senators. Hiram
Johnston, a Republican maverick from California, former leader of the Progressive
Party, and supporter of Roosevelt in the  presidential election campaign, led
the charge. Accusations of intentional over-lending, deceptive prospectuses and
10 Select Committee, p. , Q. .
11 Select Committee, pp. –, Q. . The question was: ‘Supposing this is done by the agent of the
[underwriter] simply to launch the loan, and he authorizes one broker to buy, and another to sell,
at a price which is a premium, do you think that is a healthy state of things to exist?’
12 See Flandreau and Flores () for a study of howRothschilds established their connection with suc-
cessful loans in the early nineteenth century, a position that was maintained afterwards according to
results in Flandreau et al. ().
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price rigging again came up. The public wanted to know about price manipulation,
which was said to be rampant. The public wanted to know about briberies and insider
lending.
Again, the problem of secrecy of bankers’ profits from foreign loans was para-
mount. Large fees were said to have been associated with wrongdoing. And when
the price of foreign bonds plummeted in New York, resentment against bankers
became acute. In the words of one contemporary observer: ‘The heavy drop in
prices of German bonds following the default of many South American loans has
aroused a bitter feeling against the “international banker”.’One factor which particu-
larly irritated the public was the belief that the bankers derived ‘excessive profits from
the sale of these bonds while investors who had to resell them suffered severe losses’.13
And there was the familiar worry about bankers’ bonuses, which were high when the
market was low.
It thus became a principal task of the Senate Hearings, as it had been for the Select
Committee  years earlier, to collect information on fees for the placement of foreign
debt. Among the records that were then registered was the ‘Lower Austrian Hydro-
Electric Power’, a bond backed by the Austrian government issued in August .
The fee pocketed by the syndicate led by F. J. Lisman was  per cent. This was a
somewhat extreme number and the Austrian Hydro-Electric Power was an obscure
concern. The bond would default in August . Other instances included a
Polish government loan of , introduced by Dillon &Reed, for a  per cent com-
mission. Numbers were thus similar to those discovered by the Select Committee. In
one loan to Peru, underwritten by the house of Seligman, the fees included a ‘sur-
charge’ to be paid to a ‘group of promoters’, and it was learned that this group
included the son of President Leguia, who received half a million US dollars for
this.14 All Seligman’s loans to Peru were in arrears when the Senate Committee
first met and the Austrian and Polish loans followed soon after. Leguia’s son went
to Paris with the proceeds, where all the swindled money must have ended up.
This is where ‘Tom, Dick and Harry’ entered the scene. While questioning Otto
H. Kahn, of the banking house of Kuhn, Loeb & Co, Senate Committee member
Thomas Gore from Oklahoma claimed that bankers had a moral liability towards
the public to whom they sold the bonds. These bonds, he said, were bought ‘by
Tom, Dick and Harry… without any reference to the solidity or the solvency of
the bonds . . . but entirely on the faith of the house issuing them in New York’.15
The question became: who’s taking care of Tom, Dick and Harry?16 Comparisons
13 Foreword to Kuczinski ().
14 The information surfaced with the help of President Leguia’s successor, or rather the onewho toppled
him from power, who used this as a way to demonstrate the odious nature of the debts.
15 US Senate Hearings , p. .
16 Note that it is not entirely clear that Tom, Dick and Harry needed someone to take care of them.
Estimates in Morrow () suggest that the median purchase order they had placed on the market
was not small, about US$,. If we assume some minimal diversification, then Tom, Dick and
Harry were probably richer than your average Joe.
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between banking and other branches of business were made. Smith’s baker was put to
rest for this was still prohibition time and metaphors needed an update: Senator
Connally declared to Charles Mitchell, CEO of National City Bank, that ‘with refer-
ence to foreign bonds, you are like the saloon keeper who never drank. His whiskey
was made to sell, not to drink.’17 US bankers had no qualms about being compared
with merchants or even saloon keepers. Mitchell answered that ‘with respect to bonds
generally, we are merchants’.18 But bankers claimed they deserved respect, and some
argued that faith in the banker was the only measuring rod for the investor.
Poring through the , pages of evidence collected by the Senate Committee,
one observes the emergence of an articulated discourse on bankers’ responsibility.
This discourse did not stem from nothing: its basics had been spelt out earlier and
they were already part of the conventional wisdom among British bankers. But US
bankers reacted perhaps more aggressively than their British counterparts in the
s. This may have had to do with being Americans, but the bankers’ reaction
also reflected the issues at stake. The rumbles on Main Street against bankers were
about to be picked up by Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidential campaign. In
addition, the Wall Street vs Main Street theme also had a history. Ever since Pujo’s
inquiry into theMoney Trust of  – a grouping of financial interests and interlock-
ing directorates at the heart of which was the house of J. P. Morgan – and Louis
Brandeis’ questioning of what bankers do with ‘Other People’s Money’, relations
between America and its New York bankers had not been peaceful.19 The financial
crisis that followed the crash of  put financiers at a disadvantage and now that the
market collapse was morphing into a full-scale debt crisis, Main Street, and soon
Washington, was punching hard. There was also a concern amongst the public that
the Republican administration had encouraged, supported and nursed the Wall
Street establishment, and with elections approaching, politicians were making sure
they were heard. This may have forced Wall Street bankers to kick back. The
matter, as it emerged in the s, was thus far more political than was the case in
the less democratic British society of the Victorian era, and as a result it received
much political attention, ensuring a long career for Tom, Dick and Harry.
IV
Bankers went into much detail to explain why fees looked the way they did. They
explained that larger issues commanded lower fees because of scale economies: the
work was about the same as for small ones. They explained that new public offerings
commanded higher fees because new issues demanded more expensive roadshows or,
in the flowery language of the time, they involved more of a process of
17 US Senate Hearings , p. . The metaphor turned banks into some kind of speakeasy, and the
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‘enlightenment and explanation’.20 Bankers especially explained why they had an
interest in bonds meeting ends and could not just wash their hands after an issue
had succeeded. According to Otto Kahn: ‘We have an interest in the bonds until
they are repaid according to their due date. We consider that we are under a perma-
nent moral liability to do what we can for the protection of these bonds.’21 A success-
ful issue did not relieve the banker of this moral liability: ‘The question of success or
non success of an issue is one of the public’s response. Though being relieved from our
legal responsibility, the matter of our moral responsibility and of prestige and of inter-
est as issuing houses remains.’22
The main concern of the banker, they said, was to price securities properly. Wrong
pricing would not generate higher revenue. It would damage reputation. They took
care, Kahn explained, to bring to themarket only loans which could sustain economic
development, for only this would increase the likelihood of future repayments. All
these accusations of debt un-sustainability were missing the point: bankers were con-
cerned with bringing to the market high-quality loans. He insisted that Kuhn & Loeb
declined military loans.23 Just as Cazenove had suggested  years earlier, riskier
places and rash competition were avoided by serious houses: ‘It is a strict tradition
of my house not so to compete either in South America or elsewhere.’24 Being
boring, again.
The public, Kahn felt, had been under the wrong impression regarding price
manipulations. Very much like Nathaniel de Rothschild before the Select
Committee, he argued that there were cases where bankers had to step in to make
sure things worked out according to plan. He recalled the case of a loan to the
state-guaranteed Mortgage Bank of Chile when Kuhn and Loeb ‘went into the
market, and bought bonds [themselves]’.25 In fact, the process of underwriting
created a contingent liability. If there is an ‘unjustifiable decline in bonds, if there is
not a fair market for the bonds’ the underwriter ought to go into the market and
permit those who want to walk out to do so. This Kuhn and Loeb had done
‘more than once’.26 Bankers had to treat bonds they had sponsored as open-ended
investments.
Otto Kahn concluded, with lyrical tones, that a banker was like any other mer-
chant, ‘except that … the banker is called upon to exercise a greater degree of care
than pretty nearly anyone else who is dealing with the public, because he is dealing
20 US Senate Hearings . For the effect of size, see Kahn’s testimony, p. ; Seligman’s testimony,
p. : ‘The expenses in connection with the selling of a small loan necessitate a wider spread’ [by
which they mean spread between buying and selling price, or fee]. For initial public offerings being
more costly than seasoned ones, see Lamont’s testimony, pp. –.
21 Otto Kahn, US Senate Hearings , p. .
22 Ibid., p. .
23 Ibid., p. .
24 Ibid., p. .
25 Ibid., p. .
26 Ibid., p. .
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with a commodity as towhich he is considered to be an expert adviser and as to which
many people rely on his integrity’. ‘And judgment?’ pushed Senator Hiram Johnson.
But Otto Kahn was already high:
His integrity and judgment…He must resolutely decline, whatever be the monetary induce-
ment, to attach that trademark and that responsibility to any securities as to the soundness of
which there is, or ought to be, any doubt in his own mind. If he does not do all that, he is not
the kind of banker that deserves to live.27
Otto Kahn’s Oheka Castle (fromOttoHermannKahn) on Long Island suggested that
if a banker did all this, he deserved to live pretty well.
The fact was that pretty much like Rothschilds, which had had the best record in
foreign government debt, senior houses such as Morgans had a quite impeccable one,
as they were never tired of pointing out. The problem, they emphasised, was with
other bankers’ devalued talk. Despite all their efforts, the New York banking aristoc-
racy was losing rhetorical ground. In April  a second commission was appointed,
this time by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, and charged with
investigating stock exchange practices. In January , as FDR was pledging to
drive the ‘money changers’ out of the Temple, Ferdinand Pecora, an assistant district
attorney for New York County, was hired as chief counsel to write the final report.
Taking advantage of the accusation from Democrats that the Committee on Banking
and Currency had been too lenient with bankers, Pecora raised the stakes. He claimed
that more evidence was needed; and, after receiving backing from FDR, he was
allowed to examine key witnesses. Thomas Lamont of J. P. Morgan and Otto
Kahn from Kuhn and Loeb were again summoned. The way Pecora dealt with
National City Bank’s Charles Mitchell made headlines, eventually forcing the
CEO into resignation. Using threats of subpoena, Pecora managed to produce the
Morgan balance sheet. Pecora established himself as the slayer of the Morgans and
Mitchells of this world, transforming him into a leading public figure.
In his  memoirs, Wall Street under Oath, Pecora portrayed his action as a chief
inspiration for the sweeping regulatory reform of the s that included the Glass-
Steagall Banking Act of  (separating commercial and investment banking), the
Securities Act of  (setting penalties for filing false information about stock offer-
ings), and the Securities Exchange Act of  (which formed the SEC, to regulate
the stock exchanges, and of which Pecora was appointed commissioner). Indeed, the
New Deal’s financial Acts had sent the bankers into the ropes, and they would not
have been possible if a process of devaluation of all bankers’ talk had not been
implemented first, something that Pecora did, with FDR’s support. What had
changed compared to the British precedent was that prestigious bankers had not
been conferred the right to use the crisis as a performative event. They were not
allowed the opportunity to demonstrate that the crisis revealed a quite different
range of behaviour and language across financial intermediaries. They were not left
27 Ibid., p. .
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with the political opportunity to recycle the event for their own benefit as makers of
discourse. And this explains why Pecora, to the surprise of later observers, could focus
on sins venial.28 The inference must be that the extent to which economic outcomes
are infelicitous is really a political construction.
V
This paved the way for new ways of writing and talking about bankers and finance. A
large degree of distrust in private firms prevailed. The post-war order fashioned by the
likes of John Maynard Keynes in the UK or Harry Dexter White in the US empha-
sised a need for regulatory intervention. The notion that a large banking or financial
concern would be disciplined by its desire to remain in place would have been dis-
missed with a shrug. Wasn’t the interwar history a vivid proof that this was not
true? The whole regulatory architecture that had been put in place during that
time was conventionally, if perhaps inadequately, described as a response to the inter-
war debacle. It was thus conceived as a legacy of the private economy’s failure to
manage itself. Bankers had failed economically and they had failed politically. The
intellectual case followed suit. Bankers retired into mute distinction while they
glanced across from the limousine.
From this high point, a gradual transformation occurred. It started in the back-
ground, and was not discernible at first. In , Pecora felt that he could run for
Mayor of New York City, but he was not successful. Then, in , the ‘corrected
opinion’ of Harold Medina in United States of America v. Henry S. Morgan, Harold
Stanley et al. brought to a halt two decades of legal and congressional pestering of
bankers. This was also the time when Joseph McCarthy found that the real
enemies of America were not the bankers but rather people inside the US govern-
ment. More fundamentally, a process of migration of arguments on the efficiency
of greed occurred: an inherent feature of bankers’ discourse in the interwar years
found its way into the academic vernacular of the economics profession thereafter.
This migration opened up valuable possibilities. In the political climate resulting
from the ideological threat of communism during the Cold War, greed could not
have been high profile and Gordon Gekko was a distant act. However, something
could be said for well-conceived self-interest. What is conflict of interest for a
banker is scientific discourse for an economist, and this is how the door was
opened. In other words, economists performed a process of purification of bankers’
discourse.
The result was a progressive reconstruction of discourse. It did not take place in the
banking profession. As bankers walked away from the argument on greed, economists
took over. They brought their stuff with them – models, data, editors and referees –
and started making themselves at home. It is not easy to pin down the point where the
changeover took place. Academia was the hotbed where arguments once voiced by
28 See Huertas and Silverman () for a thorough discussion of Mitchell’s indictment.
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bankers before the Senate Committee were spawned. As it turned out, new econ-
omics, as it flourished in the s after the Keynesian ice age of macro-modelling,
was to provide fertile ground for arguments about corporate responsibility. The pro-
fession began to focus far more on the fine shades of strategic interactions that are
involved when studying credibility. It was realised that if you fooled one thousand
persons once you would be unlikely to succeed again – in fact, if you had the slightest
reason to fool them in the first place, you would not even manage to achieve that
much, for they would second-guess you. The argument received a name (rational
expectations) and a Nobel Prize (in ). But then, if the argument were true,
bankers in the s, in the s or in the s could not be all liars all the time.
VI
But by the time Oliver Stone’s movie Wall Street was released, economists had
become very much in love with greed. The reconstruction of greed as something
one could bank on was a multipronged effort and it is impossible to summarise the
process here, given space constraints. However, we can focus on three milestones.
Each one represented one bit of the full argument and taken together they summarise
nicely the main stages in the emergence of this new wisdom. Each was represented by
a popular ‘model’ – the economic word for narrative.
The appropriation of the arguments used by bankers in the interwar period started
in an unlikely place. George Akerlof’s tale of a ‘market for lemons’ described the dif-
ficulties encountered in trading used cars. Because sellers know roughly how bad the
cars they sell are but prospective buyers don’t, the very existence of such a market is
difficult to sustain. Sellers will set a price buyers are not prepared to pay, because
buyers discount the risk of being sold a bad car. But at the low price, which fully
covers buyers for the risk of getting a lemon, only bad cars would get sold. One
interpretation of Akerlof’s argument is that only the market for lemons can
prosper, because it is a market that everybody can understand (Akerlof ). At
the same time, because the market for lemons is where the maximum uncertainty
exists, it is likely that such a market would be shallow. In the end, Akerlof suggested,
the whole foundations of the exchange economy are fragile.
The lemons story permitted the study of a wide array of new problems. Once the
difficulties identified by Akerlof were recognised as challenges to the functioning of a
normal trading system, economists began exploring the various solutions that markets
design to deal with them. Carl Shapirowas among the first researchers to take a look at
the interactions between the lemons problem and reputation, providing a second
building block (Shapiro ). Whereas Akerlof’s story was one in which there was
no way to trade in good products, Shapiro suggested that investment in reputation
could permit the emergence of a market for quality. The reasoning (very similar to
the claims of interwar bankers) was that rational agents would find their interest in
selling high-quality products because they would secure higher revenues. This
could work as follows: sellers would invest in reputation by behaving well and this
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would make it costly for them to cheat the public. The reason is that cheating would
destroy earlier investment in reputation. This would be a credible strategy, because
we, as customers, would realise that, in Smith’s words, it is not from the benevolence
of the seller that we should expect to receive high-quality goods but from their regard
for their own interest. Peoplewould then be prepared to pay more for quality, and this
would justify the initial investment and beyond. Thus, to the extent that some market
power and a sufficiently long time horizon are available, high-quality goods can be
traded.
The last stage in the consolidation of the theory is associated with the work of
Douglas Diamond, who expanded on Shapiro’s intuition. Shapiro had shown that
there was a connection between market power and quality. Diamond furthered the
reasoning by studying in greater detail the strategic implications of this notion,
looking at how reputation is secured (Diamond ). His story was meant to
suggest that over time, once a good reputation is acquired, it provides improved
incentives for disciplining behaviour. Unlike Akerlof’s, the paper talked of debt
and the financial system: dealers in used cars were left behind.
For financial economics, Diamond’s model implied that alternative means to foster
reputation or to establish it more rapidly could be considered. This became a kind of
‘folk theorem’ (i.e. everybody’s result), which dozens of papers rediscovered indepen-
dently. Financial economists began emphasising that a bank’s capital or its market
share, or more generally anything that the financial institution could lose in case of
treachery, could serve to discipline decision makers. Size came back not as the hall-
mark of market abuse painted in the s and s, but as a good housekeeping
seal of approval. Provided with a long enough time horizon and with a large
enough market share, we could trust big financial conglomerates to ensure that by
pursuing their own interest they would best serve their customers – and us all.
From then on, models started spawning that suggested we could trust the long-
lived large firms to monitor ‘themselves and their own’ because they had the
motives to accumulate and retain a critical mass of reputation capital. History was
enrolled in the process, too. Revisionist accounts of historical experience with finan-
cial concentration became an important aspect of the intellectual revolution. The
outcome was that scholars started suggesting that bankers had not done so badly.
The time was ripe for a rediscovery of the Money Trust.
Economic historian and long-time Larry Summers’ co-author Bradford DeLong
took care of the harvest. In a  article (‘Did J. P. Morgan’s men’s add value? An
economist’s perspective on financial capitalism’) he sought to provide a ‘modern’ per-
spective on the early twentieth-century debates on the ‘Money Trust’ (DeLong ).
When contemporaries had worried over the monopoly power of J. P. Morgan and
associated investment banks, DeLong suggested that high concentration in investment
banking may have played a positive role in supporting America’s ‘ﬁnancial capitalism’
in its early days. This was because of the familiar argument that a bank with a large
market share would reap proportionate beneﬁts conditional upon having a good
name. If reputations were vulnerable, large banks would find it most profitable in
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the long run to strive to be above suspicion. According to DeLong, the Money Trust
would refuse to ‘imperil [its] reputation for the sake of higher short-run profits in any
one deal as long as the ﬁnance industry’s future and its own market share appear
secure’. By contrast, ‘a ﬁrm with a small market share would decide to “cash in” its
reputation by luring investors into a proﬁtable deal that is unsound’.29 The following
exchange during the already discussed Senate Committee’s examination of Otto Kahn
provides a counterpart. At one stage, an examiner said something about allegations that
poor small banks had been arm-twisted by large nasty ones into distributing bad secu-
rities, for fear of being excluded from future operations. To this the (large) banker
answered, cautiously: ‘the fact that bankers are little does not in itself make them
any more virtuous than others who are less little’.30 While significantly more explicit
and vibrant than Kahn’s terse reference to little bankers who are not any more virtuous
than others who are less little, DeLong’s argument is not altogether different.
DeLong thus concluded that J. P. Morgan’s men did more economic good than
harm. No doubt, JP was greedy. No doubt, it was driven by self-interest. But his con-
clusion was that J. P. Morgan’s men, by sitting on the board of companies and steering
them to success, yielded big benefits. They created value through signalling and
control.31 The Trust could quickly replace managers whose performance was unsa-
tisfactory and signal to ultimate investors that a company was well managed and
sound. In the end, greed would not only save Teldar Paper, but it had already
saved that other malfunctioning corporation called the Money Trust.
Little by little, the rational, matter-of-fact utterances of Adam Smith about bakers,
butchers and brewers have received the identifiable hallmark of economics as we
know it today, with their ring of complacent cynicism. The inevitable concern for
the motivations of the merchant who sells bread, or meat, or beer, with which we
feed our bodies, focused people’s minds and discussions. It became a reason for reas-
surance through a process which is hard to describe as anything other than sublima-
tion. This, and the related narratives that went parading as a result under the flag of
‘modern’ economics, played a powerful symbolic role in permitting the regulatory
transformations that have unleashed the American and global financial system in
the last quarter of a century.32 Whatever had been the initial motivations for introdu-
cing the regulation of the s, and whatever their relevance or irrelevance then (still
a matter for historians to decide), the new generation of economists believed they
sounded passé in a world where financial institutions could take care of themselves,
or face the prospect of dying. Undoubtedly, the reconstruction of bankers’ discourse
29 For this and for much of the language in this paragraph, see DeLong ().
30 US Senate Hearings , p. .
31 ‘In – the presence on one’s board of directors of a partner in J. P. Morgan and Co. added about
 percent to common stock equity value, and about  percent to the total market value of the firm.’
DeLong’s computations have been challenged by British scholars. See e.g. Hannah () for a critical
discussion of De Long’s estimates; also Frydman and Hilt ().
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in modern economists’ language was the posthumous triumph of J. P. Morgan and
their people over Washington and the lawmakers in the Pujo Committee and
Pecora hearings.
VII
That the battle was won on the turf of economics is not anecdotal. As already
suggested, bankers had repeatedly tried to sell the notion that they could act as ben-
evolent trustees. The matter came up, appropriately, during a meeting that occurred
between Thomas W. Lamont, the J. P. Morgan partner, and Louis D. Brandeis, the
author of the anti-Morgan pamphletOther People’s Money. The meeting took place in
New York on  December , at the University Club, and its minutes transcribed
from memory have been kept at the Baker Library in Harvard. Many aspects of the
Money Trust were reviewed during the long conversation.33 At one point, an intri-
guing exchange took place. This was when Lamont (unsuccessfully) encouraged
Brandeis to consider, as a theoretical possibility, that the conflict of interest on
which the lawyer had cast his sight was manageable:
TWL: Does it occur to you Mr Brandeis, that possibly when men are put in the position of
trustees they may prove to be more scrupulous if they have some possible interest in both sides
of the question, than if they were exclusively on one side?
LDB: No that does not occur to me Mr Lamont. I think the relationship is an impossible
one … In the very nature of things, a man cannot argue for and against.34
This exchange provides a  response to theories that were yet to be articulated –
theories that have come into the mainstream of economic discourse during a much
more recent period. Lamont’s argument was nothing but a preview of DeLong’s
defence of the Money Trust. The trustee can act in proper ways if he has some
‘skin in the game’. Brandeis’ outright rebuttal of the argument is what is intriguing.
Of course, Brandeis did have the needed intellectual sophistication to ‘understand’
the ‘logic’ of the argument. His insistence that such a thought did not occur to
him, on the other hand, suggests that his reasoning was operating in a totally different
space than where the banker was trying to push him.
The discussion of the Money Trust he provided inOther People’s Money gives indi-
cations of what was on Brandeis’ mind. First there was the principle, legal, and not
economic, that no one can be the servant of two masters. The banker is attending
to his interest and to that of his customer, and this is already one issue. Second,
Brandeis was concerned with the growth of a financial superpower that would
escape political control and threaten American democracy. The Money Trust and
J. P. Morgan, he argued, represented precisely that kind of risk. In the world of
33 Lamont’s Papers, –. As usual, the reputation argument came up several times, for instance, when
Lamont’s argued: ‘We give our best advice on the financial policy, looking both backward and
forward over a series of years, for the purpose of building up and entrenching the company’s credit.’
34 Lamont’s Papers, –, p. .
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economists, the two problems are seen as taking care of one another – the banking
superpower provides a reason for moderation and limits the agency (in the language
of economists) or trustee (in the language of lawyers) problem. This ‘solution’, which
is not unlike humorous proposals to fill the hole in the ozone layer with nuclear waste,
was operating in an impossible world, in the sense of mathematicians, or perhaps lin-
guists: namely, a world with no foundations.
This explains why Brandeis, contrary to later suggestions, did not discount the
possibility that such an arrangement be ‘efficient’, and actually, Other People’s
Money has a whole section where he addresses this very question (he was sceptical),
as other scholars have since then.35 But the important element, for him and for us,
was that this efficiency was meaningless. For a while, Brandeis’ new rhetoric broke
on bankers’ deeply entrenched positions and their control of the media, of the US
Congress and, later on, of the US presidency. This explains why the Great
Depression ended up being epoch making. The financial catastrophe that ensued
was the vindication of Brandeisian views that the world that had been built was
without foundations. For bankers’ narratives that all was well in the world of
agency, and that skin in the game and market power would ensure proper treatment
of customers, the crash of  and the credit and debt crisis of the early s were
infelicitous. With reputation now gone or shaken, the Brandeisian narrative revisited
agency problems and replaced the bankers’ reassurances that they were being careful
with a new emphasis on ‘conflicts of interest’.36
VIII
So far however, I have only aligned a number of findings, like pebbles brought back
from a long walk on the beach. It is time to draw the tale to a close. One striking aspect
of current inquiries is their somewhat different focus compared to earlier experiences.
While the Select Committee of  and the Senate Committee of – were
explicitly concerned with examining bankers’ wrongdoing, such blunt references
have all but disappeared in the mandates of their modern counterparts. The incredibly
long list of assignments that have fallen upon the shoulders of the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission does not include clear requests to investigate the behaviour of
investment banks. Many other items refer instead to problems of regulation, regulat-
ory arbitrage and flawed incentives. Its mandate is to ‘examine the causes of the
current financial and economic crisis in the United States’. This includes, along
with more than  other items, ‘lending practices and securitization, including the
originate-to-distribute model for extending credit and transferring risk’ (item )
and ‘the quality of due diligence undertaken by financial institutions’ (item ).
Likewise, hearings that have taken place so far were more concerned with trying to
35 Brandeis ([] ), ‘How bankers arrest development’, pp. ff. See also Hannah ().
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establish wrongdoing in certain specific instances, rather than a general pattern. In any
case, the conversation is still conducted in terms of efficiency and performance, and, as
a result, it is still structured by the former migration of bankers’ discourse into the
language of economics.
This should encourage investment rather than divestment. We should collectively
aim at widening economists’ language (meaning, we should be ready to consider
issues that are broader than the computation of local maxima) and take advantage
of this crisis of discourse to extend perspectives. Just as the interwar debacle disquali-
fied bankers’ narratives, the market collapse that brought down Lehman brothers has
questioned economists’ narratives. This has come to be recognised within the econ-
omic profession itself, at least in the first hours of the panic. For instance, Daron
Acemoglu, an MIT economist, provided an early characterisation of the subprime
crisis as being the fall-out of what I have called the reconstruction of bankers’ dis-
course as the language of economics:
Our logic and models suggested that even if we could not trust individuals, particularly when
information was imperfect and regulation lacklustre, we could trust the long-lived large firms –
companies such as the Enrons, the Bear Stearns, the Merrill Lynchs, and the Lehman Brothers
of this world – to monitor themselves and their own because they had accumulated sufficient
reputation capital. Our faith in long-lived large organisations was shaken but still standing after
the accounting scandals in Enron and other giants of the early s. It may now have suffered
the death blow. (Acemoglu , pp. –)
In other words, while a patient reconstruction had us almost ready to believe that
bigger is better, we learn that this may not be the case always and everywhere and
that, when the system fails, big financial groups are just this – big powers that
cannot be controlled any more. To paraphrase Otto Kahn, we have now to come
to grips with the fact that bankers being big does not in itself make them any more
virtuous than others who are less big. Surprising as it sounds, the belief in the
long-lived large firm was the ghost of words spoken by deceased bankers.
It should be by now clear that a main lesson frommy discussion is that the situation
today is quite different from that in the s. The availability of the legal language
articulated by Brandeis a generation before the interwar crisis cooperated with
FDR’s decision to damage the influence of J. P. Morgan to produce a revolution
in speech. This revolution, I have suggested, had little to do with the event of the
crisis itself, as comparison with the outcome of the British ‘rehearsal’ of the s
shows. An open question is what is going to happen to economists’ discourse as a
result of the current crisis. A British-type outcome is not altogether implausible,
although one cannot see how the current event can be recycled in support of
earlier mainline economic rhetoric.
This observation also underscores the role of different financial gatekeeping tech-
nologies before and after the Great Depression, as identified for instance in my work
with Flores, Gaillard andNieto-Parra (Flandreau et al. ). In the case of the two public
inquiries used in this article, the main gatekeepers were the investment and merchant
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banks, whereas in the recent period a third player was added to the story – the credit
ratings agencies. In practice, these have performed the function (useful, from the
bankers point of view) of diverting the flow of public opprobium away from the
bankers. This is not at all surprising given that the rise of rating agencies during the
s had little to do with their performance at the time (Moody’s suddenly down-
graded  per cent of sovereign debt in the week following the sterling crisis in
September ), and much to do with regulatory intervention in the US to
assuage fears of conflicts of interest among issue bankers (Flandreau et al. ).
Likewise, the Securities Act of  created a situation of ‘sellers beware’ that encour-
aged underwriters to develop business practices that would minimise liability. Being
able to rely on the ‘independent’ grades delivered by nationally recognised rating
agencies had obvious virtues. In sum, the regulatory regime that emerged after the
New Deal cut the mechanism whereby bankers’ actions had repeatedly been
brought into question: we hear here and there accusations against Goldman Sachs,
but they are a trifle compared to historical counterparts. The amorphous contours
of the entities targeted by the Occupy movement (‘Wall Street’) illustrate nicely
the difficulty that critics find today in identifying a culprit. This may not be unrelated
to the role played by economics today in obfuscating responsibilities.
Finally, there is no doubt that rating agencies played a critical role in spreading the
perception that uncertainty can be turned into objectivised risk by wholesale trading
in a market for contingent claims: everything would get a ‘grade’ – a price. This
relieved intermediaries of the need to accumulate capital to back up their reputational
commitment to the securities they issued. In this version of the ‘wisdom of crowds’
argument, rating agencies may have provided the context and actual force that per-
mitted the appropriation of the ‘greed discourse’ by economics – without which
the theoretical reconstructions of the s and s could not take place. It may
not be entirely surprising, therefore, that an important discussion has just begun on
rating agencies, the role they have played in the current crisis, and the role they
should play in a possibly reconstructed international financial system.
Submitted:  August 
Revised version submitted:  November 
Accepted:  November 
References
ACEMOGLU, D. (). The crisis of : structural lessons for and from economics. CEPR Policy
Insight No. .
AKERLOF, G. A. (). The market for ‘lemons’: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, (), pp. –.
BRANDEIS, L. D. ([] ). Other People’s Money and How Bankers Use It. New York: Jackett
Library.
CAROSSO, V. P. (). Washington and Wall Street: the New Deal and investment bankers,
–. Business History Review, (), pp. –.
MARC FLANDREAU
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0968565011000291
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 15:01:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
DELONG, B. (). Did J. P. Morgan’s men add value? An economist’s perspective on financial
capitalism. In P. Temin (ed.), Inside the Business Enterprise: Historical Perspectives on the Use of
Information. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. –.
DIAMOND,D.W. (). Reputation acquisition in debt markets. Journal of Political Economy, (), pp.
–.
DICKENS, C. (). A Tale of Two Cities. London: Chapman and Hall.
DRUMMOND WOLFF, H. (). Rambling Recollections. London: Macmillan, .
FLANDREAU, M. and FLORES, J. (). Bonds and brands: foundations of sovereign debt markets
–. The Journal of Economic History, (), pp. –.
FLANDREAU, M. and FLORES, J. (). Bondholders vs bondsellers: relationship banking and
conditionality lending in the London market for government debt, –. European Review of
Economic History, forthcoming.
FLANDREAU, M., FLORES, J., GAILLARD, N. and NIETO-PARRA, S. (). The end of
gatekeeping: underwriters and the quality of sovereign debt markets, –. In L. Reichlin
and K. West (eds.), NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics, vol. . Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
FLANDREAU,M., GAILLARD, N. and PACKER, F. (). To err is human: US rating agencies and
the interwar foreign government debt crisis. European Review of Economic History, , pp. –.
FRYDMAN, C. and HILT, E. (). Predators or watchdogs? Bankers on corporate boards in the era of
finance capitalism. Working paper.
HANNAH, L. (). What did Morgan men really do? CIRJE-F- working paper, University of
Tokyo.
HUERTAS, T. F. and SILVERMAN, J. L. (). Charles E. Mitchell: scapegoat of the crash? Business
History Review, (), pp. –.
JENKS, L. H. (). The Migration of British Capital to . London: Thomas Nelson.
KROSZNER, R. and RAJAN, R. (). Is the Glass-Steagall Act justified? A study of the US
experience with universal banking before . American Economic Review, (), pp. –.
KUCZINSKI, R. (). Bankers’ Profits from German Loans. Washington: Brookings.
MORROW, D. W. (). Who buys foreign bonds? Foreign Affairs, January.
RILEY, J. C. (). International Government Finance and the Amsterdam Capital Market, –.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
SHAPIRO, C. (). Premiums for high quality products as returns to reputations. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, (), pp. –.
SMITH, A. (). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: Strahan and
Cadell.
SUTER, CH. (). Debt Cycles in the World-Economy: Foreign Loans, Financial Crises, and Debt
Settlements, –. Boulder: Westview.
Sources
Lamont’s Papers: Thomas W. Lamont’s Papers, Baker Library, Harvard University.
Select Committee (): Report from the Select Committee on Loans to Foreign States, together with the
Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix and Index, Parliamentary Papers ,
XI, Parliament, House of Commons. London.
US Senate Hearings (): Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in the United States, Hearings Before the
Committee on Finance, US Senate, nd Congress. Washington, DC.
THE VANISHING BANKER 
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0968565011000291
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 15:01:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
